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Abstract—Implementation attacks are a major threat to 
hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit 
the correlation existing between the computed data and variables 
such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic 
(EM) emissions.  Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an 
effective passive and active attack technique against secure 
implementations. In this paper, we review the recent results 
obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault 
injection tool. 
Keywords—Secure implementations; Side Channel Analysis; 
Fault Attacks; EM 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In the current society, a huge amount of information is sent 
and received in a digital form. In many domains, this 
information may be sensitive and may thus require to be 
protected against unauthorized access. Services such as 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication can be provided by 
cryptographic protocols, which can be implemented in 
hardware when a high level of performance is required. Any 
weakness in the implementation of the cryptographic 
primitives would therefore be critical. 
Attacks targeting directly the implementation are a very 
serious threat to the security of a system. Among all the 
attacks, those based on the observation of some physical 
quantity related to the data being computed (i.e., side channel) 
are perhaps the most dangerous, since they exploit the 
correlation between the values used in the secure computation 
and the electrical activity of the device. This channel may be 
the computation time, the power consumption, or, more 
recently, the electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Another class of 
attack, based on the active perturbation of the computation 
process by injection of errors, is more complex to put into 
practice, but even more dangerous in terms of efficiency of the 
attack. Several techniques can be used in order to perturb the 
computation: alterations in the operating environment, in the 
power supply, or in the clock signal; additionally, illumination 
by laser or EM waves can also provide a precise and effective 
technique of injecting errors into the circuit. 
The EM emissions as an observation channel have been 
first considered in [1]. While the analysis of the power 
consumption can only reveal information at a global level, the 
EM channel allows focusing the observation on a specific local 
part of the circuit, namely the cryptographic coprocessor, 
without being masked by the contribution of the other blocks in 
the device. It is therefore much more precise and dangerous.  
Electromagnetic waves can be used also as an active non-
invasive medium of attack, although most research effort has 
been focused mainly on the generic problem of EM 
susceptibility. Moreover, the advancing fabrication process, 
aimed at increasing performance and reducing power 
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Fig. 1.   Direct Power Injection Platform [2]. 
 
Fig. 2.   EM pulse injection platform. 
requirements, has as a collateral consequence that the circuits 
are also more vulnerable to external perturbations. Signals and 
components become more and more sensitive to transient 
perturbation at every technological step. 
This paper presents the most recent results in the 
exploitation of the electromagnetic channel to mount attacks 
against a few building blocks of secure implementations, either 
by passive analysis or by active error injection. The paper is 
structured as follows: the next section describes the main 
technological issues related to the interaction between EM 
waves and cryptographic implementations. In Section III, we 
present the main results obtained for different targets and 
scenarios, in order to give a comprehensive picture of an EM 
attack. Section IV presents the more advanced issues, such as 
the complexity of specific experimental cases, and a deeper 
analysis of the interaction between the EM injection probe and 
the circuit logic. Existing and prospective countermeasures are 
discussed in Section IV.D. A quick overview of EM analysis is 
given In Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. DEVICES AND TECHNOLOGIES 
Secure circuits like smartcard feature different 
functionalities among which the most important is the secure 
storage of secret data. To ensure the confidentiality and the 
integrity of secrets, cryptosystem must be able to 
encrypt/decrypt data by means of a secret key. In order to 
achieve this, cryptographic implementations are usually a 
combination of digital logic, used to implement the 
cryptographic algorithm, and analog logic, used to implement 
the clock tree (Embedded CLocK Generators, ECLKG) and 
random number generators (RNG), often used to generate 
temporary keys. The characteristics of analogue and digital 
blocks are radically different from a temporal point of view. 
This implies two different means of injecting EM perturbations 
in secure IC: one targeting critical analogue blocks such as 
ECLKG or RNG, and another one targeting the glue logic 
performing some digital cryptographic operations. We describe 
below the experimental setups and the results for both cases. 
Analogue blocks can be attacked successfully by using 
powerful harmonic (continuous) waves. A stable sinusoidal 
signal must be generated at a given frequency, which is chosen 
either after analysis of the design or by experimentation, in 
order to maximize the effect of the injection. The goal of 
injecting such a harmonic wave is either to introduce a parasitic 
signal biasing the behavior of the block, or to inject some 
additional power directly and locally into the chip. Digital 
blocks on the other hand are clocked: to disrupt their behavior, 
EM pulse injection is preferable in order to inject faults in a 
specific clock cycle in a controllable way. It aims at injecting a 
sudden and sharp EM pulse into the IC so that intense transient 
currents, altering the behavior of logic cells, are produced. 
The experimental setup for harmonic injection is depicted 
in Fig. 1. The system features several components: a motorized 
XY stage, modules for signal generation (data inputs and EM 
signal), the device itself, and an oscilloscope. The components 
are controlled by a PC, which is in charge of the configuration 
and the retrieval of the results. Fig. 2 shows instead the setup of 
the EM Pulse Injection platform. As shown, it features a high 
voltage pulse generator and a coil with a ferrite core as 
injection probe, rather than a thin tungsten rod as in Fig.1. 
III. MAIN RESULTS 
A. Ring Oscillators 
Ring oscillators are loops of combinational logic, usually 
chains of inverters, where the output of the chain is fed back at 
its input. Since there is no memory element within the loop, the 
state of such ring may continuously oscillate between low and 
high logic values, with characteristics which depend on the 
structure of the ring, the physical parameters of the specific 
implementation, and the environmental conditions. This 
construct is therefore often used as the basic building block for 
clock generators or Random Number Generators (RNG). 
In [2], the authors have shown that with high frequency 
(1GHz) harmonic injection, it was possible to inject, locally 
into the chip, enough power into the power ground network to 
take control of an internal clock generator designed in 90nm. 
Additionally they have shown that the increase (up to 50%) of 
the frequency, Δf, of the internally generated clock signal was 
following the average supply voltage increase, ΔV, observed in 
presence of harmonic injection. This is illustrated in Fig. 3, 
 
Fig. 5.   Floorplan of the AES implementation and associated fault 
injection cartography [7]. 
 
Fig. 4.   Fault occurrence rate versus pulse amplitude [4]. 
 
Fig. 3.  Evolutions of Δf and ΔV with respect to to the power 
Pforward injected into the probe. 
which shows the evolution of Δf and ΔV with respect to the 
power injected into the probe. 
B. Random Number Generators 
As it was presented in the last section, ring-oscillators are 
good candidates for TRNG design for both FPGA and ASIC 
implementations. Moreover, they can be also used for Physical 
Unclonable Function (PUF) design. However, one major 
constraint must be satisfied: all the ring oscillators must be 
completely independent. Still, it is possible to change the 
working conditions of the ring oscillators to make them 
dependent. A phenomenon of locking of the ring oscillators can 
then occur. This locking phenomenon was highlighted by 
Bochard et al. in 2010 by manipulating the supply voltage of 
the RO-based true random number generator (TRNG) [3]. 
Based on this preliminary study, we have used electromagnetic 
fault injection to change the behavior of ring oscillators 
embedded in FPGA [4]. We have also used the electromagnetic 
channel to collect information such as the oscillator frequency 
and the physical location of the oscillators inside the chip [5]. 
Similar results were obtained in [6] when the target was 
specifically RO-PUF. These works clearly challenge the use of 
ring oscillators for TRNG and PUF design. The security 
requirements for TRNG and PUF designs are: (1) that ring 
oscillators have to be completely independent; and (2) that the 
frequency of the ring oscillator has to be hidden. Because of 
electromagnetic attacks, these requirements are no longer 
guaranteed. 
To illustrate that we are able to manipulate the RO-TRNG 
behavior with electromagnetic harmonic injection, Fig. 4 
shows the TRNG output bitstream produced at several levels of 
electromagnetic injected power during the experiments 
(targeting FPGA implementation [4]). Each sample is 
composed of 120 successive 32-bit frames (black and white 
squares corresponding to ones and zeros, respectively). Note 
that under normal conditions (Figure 2.a), the RO-TRNG 
bitstream passed NIST statistical tests applied on 1000 
sequences of 1 Mbit. At higher injected power, the output 
becomes clearly biased. 
C. Cryptographic Co-Processors 
In [7], the authors attacked an AES implemented on a 
Xilinx Spartan 3. The architecture is quite straightforward: a 
communication and control module, an on-the-fly key 
expansion module, and an iterative encryption module were 
implemented on the programmable chip.  
The whole surface of the package was exposed to localized 
EMPs with a displacement step equal to the probe diameter. 
This gave a total of 30x30 injection locations, shot 1000 times 
each during the last round of the encryption. Results are shown 
in Fig. 5, where the injection cartography (on the right) is 
associated to the floorplan of the design (on the left). It can be 
seen that the effects of EM pulses are clearly local, and that 
there is a good correlation between the most sensitive regions 
and the placement of the AES logic (both encryption round and 
key scheduler). Additionally, there is also a clear symmetry 
which is not coming from the implemented design, but rather 
from the geometric layout of the programmable chip. This will 
be further discussed in Section IV.B 
D. General Purpose CPUs 
In [8], the authors performed an attack on an up-to-date 32-
bit microcontroller based on the ARM Cortex-M3 processor. 
Their attack targeted the round counter of a software AES 
implementation. They used a pulsed electromagnetic fault 
injection technique to skip a chosen assembly instruction and 
add an extra encryption round. Then, they proposed a 
cryptanalysis to recover the encryption keys by using the faulty 
outputs.  
A more in-depth analysis of the effect of electromagnetic 
pulses has been provided in [9]. In this article, the authors 
showed the influence of some electromagnetic injection 
experimental parameters by performing attacks on some 
isolated assembly instructions. More precisely, they studied the 
influence of the injection antenna’s position over the circuit, 
the injection time, and the pulse’s electrical characteristics. On 
the selected target, they managed to force some data transfers 
from the memory to 0xFFFFFFFF by targeting a single ldr 
instruction (that loads a piece of data from the memory into a 
register). By performing attacks on a sequence of nop 
instructions, they also highlighted the fact that some binary 
opcodes could be corrupted and some instructions could be 
 
Fig. 7.   First electrical fault model of EM harmonic injection 
targeting the D flip-flop of a RO-TRNG. 
 
Fig. 8.   Second electrical fault model of EM harmonic injection 
targeting the D flip-flop of a RO-TRNG. 
 
Fig. 6.   Bus transfers on the Cortex-M3 instruction bus with an 
electromagnetic glitch fault injection [9]. 
 replaced by others. In their experiments, they managed to 
execute a str instruction (that stores a register into the 
memory) instead of a nop by using a fault injection. 
According to their analysis, the bus transfers from the Flash 
memory (both for instructions and data) can be corrupted by an 
electromagnetic pulsed fault injection. The Flash memory has a 
long response time for bus transfers. Thus, on an AMBA AHB 
bus, the value to transfer is written on the bus at the end of a 
clock cycle. Bus transfers and pipeline stages during the 
execution of a nop sled are shown on Fig. 6. Since instruction 
fetches are 32-bit wide, two 16-bit nop are loaded at each fetch 
pipeline stage. This figure shows that the two fetched 
instructions are written on the bus at the end of a clock cycle 
and thus are corrupted by an electromagnetic glitch. To sum 
up, the fault injection technique used in this paper induces 
timing constraint violation faults [7]. Thus, it seems that 
because of their low slack such bus transfers are the first to be 
hit. 
IV. ADVANCED MODELING 
A. Harmonic EM injections targeting RO-TRNG 
Besides the direct effect on the ring oscillators involved in 
the RO-TRNG structure (i.e., the phenomenon of RO locking 
depicted in [5]), other effects are observed during RO-TRNG 
attacks by harmonic EM injection. These effects conduct to 
the two following faults on the D flip-flop used for RO signal 
sampling: 
- Flip-flops tend to erroneously sample on some falling 
edges of the clock signal. 
- Some values sampled on the rising edge are not correct 
(meaning that either the flip-flop did not sample, or that 
the value sampled was corrupted, or that the sampling 
time moved slightly, due to some added jitter on the 
clock signal). 
Note that compared to the first fault, the second fault 
appears to occur only rarely. 
To study the fault model on the D flip-flop we have used 
two models. The first one, depicted in Fig. 7, models the 
EM injection as a sinusoidal generator connected to the clock 
tree. The second one, depicted in Fig. 8, models the 
EM injection as two sinusoidal generators connected to the 
two power lines of the circuit (ground and Vdd).  
The two models provide the same faulty behavior that is 
observed during the experimental attacks on FPGA [3]. So, 
there are both “electrically” correct. Nevertheless, FPGA 
devices usually consist of several complex circuits featuring: 
- A power supply mesh with lots of loops. 
- A clock tree that is mainly composed of long lines 
(rods) which cross the whole circuit and provide 
constant clock skew at every destination point of the 
device. 
The power supply mesh tends to be disturbed by magnetic 
fields, while the clock tree is mostly disturbed by electric 
fields (see [10][11]). For these reasons, the first model is best 
for describing attacks using electric fields, while the second 
model is best for describing attacks using magnetic fields. 
Since during experimental attacks we only used electric 
probes, the first fault model modeling disturbances in the 
clock tree (clock signal) is physically correct. 
B. Pulsed EM Injections  
The experiments conducted in [7] highlighted a strong 
resemblance to errors originated by delay faults. If the injected 
power is increased gradually on the same spot, the probability 
of injecting an error increases (see Fig. 9). Moreover, faults 
injected by applying precise clock glitches on the same design 
led to very similar error patterns. This assumption was further 
supported by the experiments run on a design protected with a 
configurable delay guard, where the propagation latency could 
be chosen at runtime. The patterns and mechanisms of alarm 
triggering were consistent with the initial hypothesis of delay 
faults. 
 
Fig. 9.   Fault occurrence rate versus pulse amplitude [7]. 
This behavior can be explained by the fact that the EM 
pulse probably interacts with the power-ground network of the 
circuit: an additional amount of energy is thus delivered to the 
network, which alters the differential voltage supply (i.e., it 
lowers the difference between the supply voltage and the 
ground, either by lowering Vdd or by increasing the ground 
itself). Where the logic is under the influence of the EM pulsed 
injection, combinational ports are locally fed by a slightly 
lower tension, which makes them react more slowly to the 
propagation of the signal transitions. If the slowdown is larger 
than the available slack in the targeted paths, data cannot reach 
the input of the flip flops within the delay, the timing 
constraints are violated and a transient error is thus captured. 
As stated above, delay faults can be obtained also through 
perturbations to the clock (a shorter period for one or a few 
cycles) or to the supply (lower than the nominal value). These 
perturbations make the clock period shorter than the critical 
path of the circuit. Unlike these techniques, however, EM 
pulsed injections have the undeniable advantage of acting 
locally: this means that specific locations of the circuit can be 
targeted, conformingly to the experimental parameters: 
technology of the circuit, size and shape of the used probe, and 
delivered power. 
C. EM Power Coupling 
As anticipated in the previous section, understanding and 
predict the consequences of an EM pulsed injection onto a 
secure circuit is a critical challenge. In order to achieve this, 
three main issues need to be solved: a model of the injection 
probe; a model of the power coupling between the EM wave 
and the circuit layers; and finally, a model of the circuit 
operating under altered conditions. 
A detailed model of the probe allows knowing the shape 
and the intensity of the EM field created during the injection: 
with this information, the designer is able to know precisely the 
energy delivered to the circuit in every sub-region. The 
creation of such model is partly theoretical and partly 
experimental, and several works already exist. 
When the power delivered by the probe to the surface of the 
circuit is known, it is possible to calculate the amount of 
energy that is reflected or absorbed by each layer of the circuit 
[12]. To achieve this, the layout of the circuit and the 
parameters of the fabrication process must be known. The end 
result is that the amount of energy delivered to the target region 
can be estimated quite precisely. 
The amount of energy delivered to a specific region of the 
circuit can hence be used to simulate the behavior of the 
design. Before the fabrication of the first prototypes, the design 
must undergo a series of validation tests (sign-off analyses), 
being the IR-drop analysis one of them. This process ensures 
that the fluctuations of power supply, due to the dynamic load, 
do not affect the functionality of the circuit. Dedicated tools 
exist, which allow simulating the circuit under the hypothetical 
condition of an additional current generator (what-if analyses): 
a generator can thus be placed, dimensioned in function of the 
energy delivered by the electromagnetic pulse, and the circuit 
simulated under these faulty conditions in order to predict its 
behavior during an EM fault attack. 
D. Countermeasures against Electromagnetic Injection 
It has been shown in the previous sections how 
electromagnetic pulsed injections can cause local delay faults. 
On this basis, the most suited countermeasure can be chosen. In 
general, error detection is based on some form of redundancy, 
either based on resources, time, or information.  
Hardware redundancy uses two or more instances of a 
functional block to compare the results and detect any 
differences. If the blocks are far enough, then an EM pulse will 
hardly affect both instances in the same way; however, this is 
difficult to prove and it may depend on specific properties of 
the design. Moreover, the protection might fail if the attacker is 
able to shoot a strong enough pulse. Temporal redundancy is 
based on the repetition of the competition on the same 
hardware. Even if EM faults are transient, repeatability is quite 
high and this approach should be therefore avoided. 
Information redundancy uses error detecting codes to identify a 
perturbation in the computation process: their effectiveness 
depends, however, on the level of redundancy and they are 
more oriented to natural faults. They may thus become quite 
expensive or ineffective in the context of fault attacks. 
A more targeted countermeasure has been presented in [7], 
consisting in a generic solution detecting timing violations. It is 
based on a chain of multiplexers, whose length can be 
configured at runtime through proper setting of the control 
signals. Since the propagation delay of the multiplexer chain 
depends also on the supply voltage, as the rest of the circuit 
logic, it will be equally affected by the EM injection. If the 
pulse is strong enough to violate the timing constraint of the 
chain, then an alarm will be triggered. Obviously, the critical 
path of the detector chain must be properly set between the 
longest critical path of the circuit and the clock period, in order 
to avoid non detection and false positives. The placement of 
several detectors has been evaluated in [13]: up to 5 detectors 
were added to the implementation, with a negligible overhead. 
On the other hand, the number or the placement of the 
detectors was not optimal, since the authors were still able to 
bypass the countermeasure with a success rate of about 10%. 
Given the low cost of the solution, however, it is possible to 
increase the number of detectors in order to obtain a better 
protection. 
analysis [14].  
 Power EM 
Design 
Key 
bytes 
found 
Mean 
Guessing 
Entropy 
# 
traces 
(×103) 
Key 
bytes 
found 
Mean 
Guessing 
Entropy 
# 
traces 
(×103) 
Unprotected 15 1 205 16 1 155 
Solution 1 4 54 275 8 52 275 
Solution  2 5 34 287 9 17 287 
Solution  3 7 19 250 12 9 250 
All solutions 
at same time 
0 136 283 0 94 283 
 
V. ELECTROMAGNETIC ANALYSIS 
So far, we did not consider the electromagnetic channel as a 
passive source of information. Just as power consumption, 
however, EM emissions can be recorded and analyzed through 
statistical analysis (differential, correlation, or mutual 
information analysis, for instance) in order to discover the 
secret information. Moreover, the information delivered by the 
EM channel is much richer, since it does not give a limited 
global summary of the circuit, but on the other hand carries 
also a significant content of spatial and frequency information. 
Table I [14] shows the results for both EM and power analysis 
on an AES design equipped with a few countermeasures 
against side channel analysis. The results are shown in terms of 
number of key bytes revealed, number of traces required to 
obtain those results, and the mean Guessing Entropy, that is the 
average ranking of the correct key among all possible 
hypotheses. It can be seen that the EM channel is much more 
effective when it comes to side channel attacks. 
The countermeasures that can be used to counteract EM 
analysis are usually the same proposed against power analysis: 
data masking, dual rail logic and additional noise can all 
contribute to decrease the correlation between the side channel 
leakage and the secret key. It is important to observe, however, 
that the spatial connotation of EM emissions makes these 
solutions less effective; additionally, it could also be exploited 
to mount higher order attacks on different locations of the 
circuit, aiming at suppressing the contribution of the random 
masks. 
An attempt at designing a countermeasure addressing the 
spatial richness of the EM channel has been proposed in [14] 
and [15]: in these works, computations are allocated on 
different resources each time, thus decreasing the correlation 
between the traces and the key. Their cost, however, is not 
negligible, and the protection is often not sufficient, demanding 
for additional countermeasures as well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Physical attacks can be a very serious threat to secure 
implementations. Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection, 
in particular, are very effective means of revealing the secret 
information. In this paper, we have summarized the most 
recent results in several scenarios, from analog blocks to 
general purpose CPUs. In all situations, the EM channel has 
proven to be a rich, powerful, and promising technique to 
attack secure circuits. The results have clearly shown that EM 
attacks need to be considered early in the design phase and that 
suitable tools and methodologies must be adopted. 
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